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1  Introduction  

This is the first part of a comprehensive  essay on the Rawlsian view of corporate social 
responsibility  (in  short  CSR).  CSR  is  defined  as  a  multi-stakeholder  model  of  corporate 
governance and objective function based on the extension of fiduciary duties toward all the 
firm’s stakeholders (see sec. 2). A rationale for this idea is firstly given within the perspective 
of  new-institutional  economic  theory  in  terms  of  transaction  costs  efficiency.  From  this 
perspective, abuse of authority in regard to the non-controlling stakeholders emerges as the 
main unsolved problem, and which makes it impossible to sever efficiency from equity within 
the  domain  of  corporate  governance  (sec.  3).  Intuitively,  a  Rawlsian  principle  of  redress 
emerges as the natural answer to the legitimization problem of ownership and control rights 
allocations when, in order to provide  incentive to one party (incentive to undertake important 
specific investments), they give it a disproportionate advantage over other non-controlling 
stakeholders.   
Moreover, in accordance with the prevailing opinion about its voluntariness, CSR is viewed 
here as a model of corporate governance that companies may undertake by autonomous self-
regulation in terms of the explicit adoption of expressed self-regulatory norms and standards. 
This is to be understood as an institution in Aoki’s sense of the term: i.e. roughly put, as a rule 
in the behavior of a group of players which is maintained through the repeated plays of a 







other’s behavior and that induces them to act again and again according to the same rule. 
Because such an institution is self-supporting, it does not need a statutory law to be enforced; 
but neither can it be seen as the gracious, arbitrary and occasional concession of management 
discretion. With respect to Aoki’s definition of institution, however, proper understanding of 
CSR requires the addition of an explicitly expressed norm, including prescriptive principles 
and  normative standards of behavior, which is to be accounted for in terms of the firm’s 
stakeholders’ social contract (see sec. 4).  
The  account  of  the  social  contract  adopted  here  is  Rawlsian.  An  impartial  agreement  is 
reached in an hypothetical original position by putting the parties ‘under a veil of ignorance’. 
In  our  case,  this  is  a  matter  of  unanimous  and  impartial  agreement  among  the  corporate 
stakeholders that must be reached under a ‘veil of ignorance’ about the particular stakes that 
each  of  them  holds  (and  with  respect  to  any  other  personal  traits).  It  takes  place  in  the 
hypothetical bargaining that precedes the repeated non-cooperative game between the firm 
and each of its stakeholders. By this agreement, the principle of extended fiduciary duties and 
fair balance among different stakeholders is established as an explicit constraint on directors, 
managers, and in general on the party who controls discretionary decisions in the firm - a 
constraint that must prove to be effective throughout the repeated game between the firm and 
each of its stakeholders. 
The bulk of this essay, in fact, is concerned with a game theoretical explanation of the roles 
played  by  explicitly  expressed  norms  and  standards  in  so  far  as  they  are  based  on  the 
stakeholders’ impartial agreement (the social contract). Put briefly, the social contract on an 
explicit  CSR  norm  performs  essential  functions  in  solving  the  basic  game  theoretical 
problems faced in the implementation of the very broad idea of multi-stakeholder corporate 
governance (see sec. 5). These are:   
•  construing commitments to allow definition of a reputation game? such that reputation 
effects can be attached to compliance with the CSR normative model;  
•  selecting just one of the many equilibria possible in such a game as the unique equilibrium 
ex ante acceptable by all under the condition of impartial and impersonal agreement;  
•  refining the set of possible equilibria so that only those reflecting conformist motivations 
deriving from the ex ante social contract are retained as true candidates for the ex post 
emergence of the equilibrium to which actual individual actions will converge;   
•  and finally, to predict that the players’ effective reasoning in the ex post implementation 
game will converge exactly to the equilibrium that would have been selected from the ex 

ante perspective, so that the social contract proves to be essential also to the generation of 
a mutually consistent beliefs system supporting CSR as an equilibrium institution.  
This part I of the essay focuses on the first role played by the social contract. First of all, the 
social contract works as a gap filling device with respect to the holes of incomplete contracts 
linking stakeholders (or the most essential of them) with the firm (sec.5). In a context of 
incompleteness  of  contracts  and  unforeseen  contingencies,  the  repeated  reputation  game 
involving the firm (or those who control it) and each stakeholder would be badly specified 
because contingent strategies and commitment would be undefined with respect to unforeseen 
contingencies.  Then  the  intention  to  accumulate  reputation  pursuant    a  strategy  of 
stakeholders’  fair  treatment  would  be  frustrated  because  there  would  be  no  standard  of 
behavior whereby reputation could be assessed. Thus, at the outset of the stakeholders/firm 
interaction, a social contract must be established on a set of general and abstract principles of 
fair  treatment,  and  precautionary  (non  contingent)  standards  of  behavior,  which  can  be 
adapted to unforeseen contingencies: that is to say capable of defining commitments neither 
meaningless nor void if unforeseen events occur. In the absence of such an explicit norm, no 
regularity  of  reputation-based  behavior  on  the  part o f  t h e  f i r m  c o u l d  e m e r g e  t h r o u g h  i t s  
interaction with stakeholders. In the presence of an unforeseen event, the only opportunity 
open to the party occupying the position of authority in the firm would be to take advantage 
of  discretion.  Abuse  of  authority  would  be  the  natural  consequence.  The  ex  ante  social 
contract on a CSR norm is what enables completion of the game form of the reputation game 
involving the firm and its stakeholders through definition of the firm’s types that carry out  
strategies with expected behavior in whatever state, even if unforeseen.  
The further parts (part II, see Sacconi 2010b,  infra, and part III, see Sacconi 2010c) of this 
essays illustrate other roles of a Rawlsian social contract over CSR norms. It may be useful to 
the reader to have here an overview on how the whole argument will be worked out. A 
Rawlsian social contract, as said, makes possible describing the game so that several types of 
reputations, based on the full or less than full respect of the CSR model may be developed 
even  if  unforeseen  contingencies  are  involved  (part I ) .  B u t  t h e  R a w l s i a n  s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t  
performs its main role in the second function discussed in part II of the essay: that is, the ex 
ante impartial selection of a unique equilibrium amongst the many possible in the repeated 
trust  game  involving  the  firms  and  its  stakeholders.  In  this  context  it  allows  impartially 
selecting  just  one f a i r  r e p u t a t i o n  e q u i l i b r i u m  a m o n g s t  t h e  m a n y  p o s s i ble.  Elaborating  on 
Binmore’s Natural Justice (2005) (but see also Binmore, 1987, 1991, 1994 and 1998) and it 

reevaluation  of  John  Rawls  egalitarian  and  maximin  principle  of  justice  within  a  game 
theoretical perspective,  this task is accomplished again from the ex ante (under the ‘veil of 
ignorance’) point of view, but in a way that allows to find out a unique course of action that 
satisfies the requirement of incentive compatibility (i.e. a Nash equilibrium) (see part II infra). 
Further,  an  agreed  CSR  social  norm  aids  reducing  to  just  two t h e  c a n d i d a t e  r e p u t a t i o n  
equilibria  that  ex  post,  in  the  real  world  interaction  taking  place  beyond    the  “veil  of 
ignorance”, may be played after an agreement (maybe seen as cheap-talk and not-binding) 
over a general principle of fairness has been reached by the firm and its stakeholders (see part 
III Sacconi 2010 c, and Sacconi 2008). These equilibria are defined not as traditional Nash 
equilibria, but as psychological equilibria according to the theory of conformist preferences 
(Grimalda and Sacconi, 2005) developed along the lines of other behavioral game models 
(Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti, 1989; Rabin, 1993).  It is argued that the behavioral 
model of conformist preference is nothing more than the development of Rawls’ theory of the 
sense of justice, and hence is a constitutive part of a Rawlsian theory of CSR, able to include 
not just the theory of choice under veil of ignorance in the original position, but also the 
neglected theory of ex post social contract stability (Rawls, 1971; Sacconi and Faillo, 2010). 
Last, given the psychological equilibria that remain candidate as possible results of the game, 
the social contract admits to identify and to make credible the initial players’ beliefs over the 
possible  game  solutions  wherefrom  an  equilibrium  selection  dynamic  (representing  the 
revision process of mutual expectation) singles out the game solution effectively carried out 
(my  favorite  equilibrium  selection  dynamics  is  the  Harsanyi’s  tracing  procedure  –  see 
Harsanyi  and  Selten  1988).  For  a  large  array  of  situations,  that  are  cognitively  the  most 
reliable in case the players have ex ante agreed on a social norm or standard (even if the 
agreement is not binding), the process selects an equilibrium corresponding to the normative 
model of multi-stakeholder fiduciary duties (see Sacconi 2008). 

2   The definition of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as an ‘extended’ 
corporate governance model 

For many authors, corporate social responsibility is related to the stakeholder perspective in 
strategic management (Freeman 1984; Freeman and Evans, 1989). In light of a well-known 
classification by Donaldson and Preston (1995),  it may be suggested  that CSR  is a concept 
that    naturally  fits  the  level  of  normative  stakeholder  theory  (understood  as  a  normative 
managerial theory). Taking the stakeholder theory seriously from a normative point of view, 

i.e. from the point of view of the rights and legitimate claims of all company stakeholders, 
would imply that the company must be run in a ‘socially responsible’ manner. According to 
Freeman (Freeman, 1984; Freeman and Evans, 1989; Freeman and Ramakrishna Velamuri, 
2006), however, ‘social responsibility’ is not the proper expression for normative strategic 
management  within  the  stakeholder  approach  because  it  suggests  a  concern  for  ‘society’ 
which  is  collateral  and  not  deeply  integrated  into  the  firm’s  proper  economic  nature  and 
functioning. ‘Stakeholder responsibility’ would be the key concept, although many attempts 
to clarify what constitutes CSR could as well be considered ways to clarify the normative 
content of the stakeholder approach to strategic management of the modern corporation.  
Nevertheless,  even  accepting  that  CSR  essentially  means  corporate  responsibility  toward 
stakeholders,  maintaining CSR only at the level of management (managerial values, methods, 
rules and practices) seems to be reductive (see also Trebilcock, 1993). Management works 
within the limits of some institutional corporate form, and under social norms concerning the 
firm’s nature and the obligations. It is constrained, for example, by fiduciary duties and the 
institutional goals of the firm, and moreover by the exercise of residual control rights by 
owners (which may be more or less effective according to the company legal structure). I 
hence  suggest  moving  up  to  the  higher  level  of  the  firm’s  institutional  form  and  its 
governance structure, which also involves the choice of the company’s objective-function. 
Therefore,  within  the  stakeholder  approach,  this  essay  will  understand  corporate  social 
responsibility as the quality of an institutional form of the firm based on a norm (mainly an 
ethical norm, but which must nevertheless be complementary to the legal order) concerning 
its corporate governance and its objective function and - as a consequence - also its strategic 
management.  
Let us therefore propose the following definition of CSR (see also Sacconi 2006a,b, 2009):  
CSR  is  a  model  of  extended  corporate  governance  whereby  those  who  run  a  firm 
(entrepreneurs,  directors,  managers)  have  responsibilities  that  range  from  fulfillment  of 
fiduciary  duties  towards  the  owners  to  fulfillment  of  analogous  –  even  if  not  identical  - 
fiduciary duties towards all the firm’s stakeholders. 
 
Two terms must be defined in order for the foregoing proposition to be clearly understood.  
a) Fiduciary duties. It is assumed that a subject has a legitimate interest but is unable to make 
the  relevant  decisions,  in  the  sense  that  s/he  does n o t  k n o w  w h a t  g o a l s  t o  p u r s u e ,  w h a t  
alternative to choose, or how to deploy his/her resources in order to satisfy his/her interest. 

S/he, the trustor, therefore delegates decisions to a trustee empowered to choose actions and 
goals. The trustee may then use the trustor’s resources and select the appropriate course of 
action. For a fiduciary relationship – this being the basis of the trustee’s authority vis-à-vis the 
trustor – to arise, the latter must possess a claim (right) towards the former. In other words, 
the trustee directs actions and uses the resources made over to him/her so that results are 
obtained that satisfy (to the best extent possible) the trustor’s interests. These claims (that is, 
the trustor’s rights) impose fiduciary duties on the agent who is entitled with authority (the 
trustee) which s/he is obliged to fulfill (Flannigan, 1989). The fiduciary relation applies in a 
wide variety of instances: tutor/minor and teacher/pupil relationships, and (in the corporate 
domain) the relationship between the board of a trust and its beneficiaries, or according to the 
predominant  opinion,  between  the  board  of  directors o f  a  j o i n t - s t o c k  c o m p a n y  a n d  i t s  
shareholders, and more generally between management and owners (if the latter do not run 
the  enterprise  themselves).  The  term  ‘fiduciary  duty’  therefore  means  the  duty  (or 
responsibility) of exercising authority for the good of those who have granted that authority 
and are therefore subject to it. 
b) Stakeholders. This term denotes individuals or groups with a major stake in the running of 
the  firm  and  that  are  able  to  influence  it  significantly  (Freeman  and  McVea,  2002).  A 
distinction should be drawn, however, between the following two categories. 
b1) Stakeholders in the strict sense. Those who have an interest at stake because they have 
made specific investments in the firm (in the form of human capital, financial capital, social 
capital  or  trust,  physical  or  environmental  capital,  or  for  the  development  of  dedicated 
technologies, and so on). They are investments that may significantly increase the total value 
generated  by  the  firm  (net  of  the  costs  sustained  for  that  purpose),  and  which  are  made 
specifically in relation to that firm (and not any other) so that their value is idiosyncratically 
related to the completion of the transactions carried out by or in relation to that firm. These 
stakeholders are reciprocally dependent on the firm because they influence its value but at the 
same time – given the specificity of their investment – largely depend on it to satisfy their 
own well-being (lock-in effect). 
b2) Stakeholders in the broad sense. Those individuals or groups whose interest is involved 
because they undergo the ‘external effects’, positive or negative, of the firm’s transactions, 
even if they do not directly participate in the transaction. Thus, they neither contribute to, nor 
directly receive value from, the firm. 

It is now possible to appreciate the scope of CSR defined as an extended form of governance. 
It  extends  the  concept  of  fiduciary  duty  from  a  mono-stakeholder setting (where the sole 
stakeholder with fiduciary duties is the owner of the firm) to a multi-stakeholder one in which 
the  firm  owes  all i t s  s t a k e h o l d e r s  f i d u c i a r y  d u t i e s  ( t h e  o w n e r s  i n c l uded).  Classifying 
stakeholders  on  the  basis  of  the  nature  of  their  relationship  with  the  firm  must  thus  be 





3  A ‘transaction-costs-economics’ rationale for extending fiduciary duties 
 
This  section  argues  that  extending  fiduciary  duties f o l l o w s  n a t u r a l l y  f r o m  a  c r i t i c a l  
understanding of the new-institutional view of the firm (see also Sacconi 2000, 2006, 2007, 
2009). The bulk of this theory is an answer to the question of  ‘why does the firm exist?’. It 
maintains that companies, and in general firms, are “unified governance structures” devoted 
to the reduction of transaction costs that would otherwise materialize due to the imperfection 
of contracts (Williamson, 1975, 1986; see also Hansmann, 1996). Specifically, three well-
known sources of costs are specified: 
(i)  First of all, contracts are incomplete in the sense that some relevant contingencies are 
unforeseen, so that concrete and contingent provisos cannot be explicitly written or 
implicitly agreed with reference to such unforeseen events.   
Contract  incompleteness  is  sometimes  tamed  by  a  much  less  deep  and  troublesome 
understanding of the subject: for modelling convenience, non-verifiability by a third party 
(i.e. a form of information asymmetry to the disadvantage of the judge or the external arbiter) 
plus  the  parties’  complete  knowledge  of  what  may  unfold  is  substituted  for  unforeseen 
contingencies  in  the  proper  sense  (see  Hart,  1995;  Grossman  and  Hart,  1986;    Hart  and 
Moore, 1990; Tirole, 1999; Maskin and Tirole, 1999). The result is that the cognitive and 
epistemological bases of contract incompleteness (bounded rationality) are swept under the 
carpet. On the contrary, it must be reasserted that the explanation rests on the empirically 
grounded assumption that the contracting parties are cognitively unable to represent, describe 
and forecast some possible states of the world, and that these states are relevant  to their 
relationship, in the sense that the contract’s outcomes and payoffs are not independent or 
separable in their definition from the states of affairs wherein they occur. At least sometimes, 

unforeseen states shape the meaning of the outcomes that they obtain from the contract (for 
example, in terms of “good” or “bad” descriptions of such outcomes, and hence different 
preferences to the receiver).    
(ii)  After signature of a contract, parties may carry out specific investments which are also 
not contractible in any  details: they  may produce  an unforeseen outcome, or their 
effects can materialize under unforeseen states of the world that cannot be ex ante 
described in such a concrete way that they are effectively includable in the contract 
through contingent provisos.  
Specific investments change the contractual parties’ relationship from  one of indifference to 
one  of  strategic  interdependence  and  bargaining  over  the  surplus  made  possible  by 
investments. In fact, what is typical of specific investments is that they increase (under some 
possible future state, not completely describable ex ante) the value of the transaction to the 
participant parties (to be precise, investments by a producer or a consumer, or both, may 
increase the value of the transacted item - a good, a service or whatsoever - to the consumer 
directly, and  hence they increase also the potential value to the producer, in so far as he may 
claim a higher price or remuneration for contributing to provide it, and he is in fact needing, 
or preferring, higher remuneration if it is possible).  
(iii)  The  parties’  behavior  under  incomplete  contract  is  to  some  relevant  extent 
‘opportunistic’: in a situation of contract incompleteness, they would try to renegotiate or 
change the terms of the contract or threaten - unless they are allotted a larger part of (or the 
entire) surplus - not to complete the transaction in the future if the profitable opportunity to do 
so appears.  
Opportunism typically takes place when specific investments by some parties have already 
been carried out and an unforeseen state of the world materializes such that these investments 
have potentially important consequences on the transaction values, even though such values 
cannot be made available without some decision under the control of an agent (not necessarily 
the one who made the investment) whereby s/he may act opportunistically in order to extract 
as much rent as possible from control over this relevant decision variable.  
To  say  that  behaviors  can  be  opportunistic  is  not  to  imply  that  people  always  behave 
opportunistically  and  that  agents  have  no  other  motive to act in different situations. It is 
simply to say that, ceteris paribus, under incomplete contracts (and specifically in the absence 
of any other agreed ethical norm underly ing  the incomplete formal contract or any  other 
social convention among participants (Lewis, 1969), with a surplus at stake as it is created by 

specific investments, there is significantly positive probability of observing the onset of the 
typical selfish behavior called ‘opportunistic renegotiation of an (incomplete) contract’.  All 
together, these assumptions have important consequences as to the explanation of why the 
firm  has  emerged  as  an  economic  institution.  Awareness  of  the  possible  renegotiation  of 
incomplete contracts (which does not entail the prediction of concrete states of the world by 
the parties, but rather that they are aware of not being able to describe and foresee all possible 
future  contingencies)  induces  the  expectation  that  investments  will  be  expropriated.  This 
destroys incentives to make efficient investments, and hence a possible surplus value will not 
be created by intelligent prudent but cognitively limited agents (in the sense of their capacity 
to draw up complete contracts). Otherwise, if some party lacks even this basic degree of 
prudence, the instability of transactions  generated by  resentment at having  been  unfairly  
exploited  will  be  observed.  Note  that  the  inefficiency  effect  of  excepted  opportunistic 
behaviors is closely bound up with the expectation by those making specific investments that 
they will be unfairly harmed. Harm is seen as deriving from expropriation of a fair share of 
the benefit to which they believe themselves entitled (whatever the holes in the contract) 
because of their contribution to the surplus’s generation.  
Against this background, the firm enters the scene as a unified governance structure able to 
alleviate the problem. Its institution, by giving ownership of physical assets to one party in the 
contract, also allocates to this party (and more in general to one stakeholder category among 
the many involved in a complex  web of related transactions) the residual right of control, i.e. 
it gives that party the right to make discretionary choices on the ex ante non-contractible 
transaction variables. (For example, either the decision whether or not to carry out a specific 
investment  or  -  once  an  investment  has  already  been m a d e  -  d e c i s i o n s  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  t h e  
investment to achieve its goal, which may affect the transaction value). Since these decisions 
may entail actions performed by individuals other than the right-holder, for a residual decision 
right to be effective it must entail formal authority over the firm, i.e. the owner’s authority to 
see decision variables - residual  with respect to those inserted in the written contract - carried 
out according to his/her will, independently of any specific agreement on the precise case in  
point and just because the right-holder ‘says so’. Formal authority in fact provides those who 
undergo the authority relationship with preemptive reasons to act (Raz, 1999); reasons that 
(within the legitimate range of authority exercise) replace other reasons to act without any 
need to enter in balance with them. However (given that authority is not merely power exerted 
by means of a threat to use force and violence), it is not obvious how this could be so. The 

explanation is that the preemptive nature of the authority’s reasons  to act results from some 
voluntary acceptance or legitimization. Thus, in order to enter into a formal authority relation, 
a party B must accept that another party A - who is in the authority position - makes decisions 
which are taken by B in general (within the range of legitimate A’s authority) as the premise 
of B’ deliberation process – i.e. neither executed for the convenience of the specific case in 
point, nor just because of the threat of punishment in case of non-compliance. This of course 
confronts  the  owner  with  the  challenge  of  justifying  (legitimating)  the  firm’s  authority 
structure, and explaining why a given residual right of control allocation should be accepted 
by those who will then be required to obey its exercise.  
But before turning to this aspect, let us recall why the allocation of residual rights of control 
to a single party may be efficient. In essence, a party holding control over the non-contractible 
decision variables of the contract will be protected against the other parties’ renegotiation 
threat, so that its investments are safeguarded against the other stakeholders’ opportunism. 
This assurance of the party being able to benefit from its own investments is a sufficient 
reason  to  invest  in  some  relevant  aspect  of  transaction  at  an  efficient  level.    Since  the 
protection of specific investments enhances efficiency, this is the basis for a transaction costs 
efficiency explanation of the firm. If the specific investment of agent A is by far the most 
important in terms of specificity, A is the natural candidate for the allocation of ownership 
and control.  
However, this is only a two-tier explanation of why the firm exists.  In fact, even if this is an 
efficiency reason for the institution of a hierarchical relationship between the party making 
specific  investments  and  any  other  party,  it  is  not e n o u g h  t o  c o p e  w i t h  t h e  f a i r n e s s  a n d  
distributive concerns that underlie the non-controlling stakeholders’ decision to accept the 
authority  of  a  party  holding  the  right  of  control  if  also  these  stakeholders  invest 
idiosyncratically.   
Consider that only in very special cases can the firm be understood as a way to regulate 
transactions among stakeholders in a network wherein only one of them has an idiosyncratic 
relation  with  the  transaction  under  consideration,  whereas  all  others  are  indifferent  about 
whatever transaction in which they may be involved. I n general, the firm makes sense as 
‘team production’, that is, as a team wherein many stakeholders cooperate by means of some 
joint and coordinated activity for the production of a joint  surplus – which can be translated 
into the view of the firm as a productive coalition with a super-additive output function. Being 
part of the team or otherwise is not a matter of indifference to each potential team member. 

An interesting result in the theory of the firm is the unification of team production with the 
new-institutional idea that specific investments are typical conditions for the emergence of the 
firm (see Blair and Stout, 1999 and 2006;  Rajan and Zinagles, 1998 and 2000; but see also  
Aoky, 1984; Sacconi 1991, 1997 and 2000 for a previous formulation of a similar  view). On 
this unified view, team production generates a surplus on each individual’s production due to 
cooperation among the team members;  but cooperation - and its joint output -  arises from a 
joint activity made possible by their complementary specific investments, and especially by 
specific investments made at the moment of joining the team. Hence, the firm becomes a 
typical case of team production among many holders of specific investments (who are also 
stakeholders  in  the  strict  sense),  with  some  other  stakeholders  potentially  subject  to  the 
(negative or positive) externality deriving from it. Stakeholders in the strict sense are those 
who are materially in the position to make specific investments or, owing to their control over 
essential  but  non-contractible  decisions,  are  themselves  essential  for  the  success  of  other 
stakeholders’ investments. By way of example,  consider  employees, both highly qualified 
and otherwise, who develop and learn firm-specific skills, competencies and behavioral codes 
which make their productivity for a given firm higher than any others (and who may also be 
idiosyncratically related to a place where the team operated due to sunk costs already incurred 
to  become  productive  in  that  location).  Or  stakeholders  in  the  strict  sense  may  be  raw 
materials  and  instrumental  goods  providers  or  technology  developers  who  sell  materials, 
goods or equipment specifically devoted to a specific firm’s production process (materials, 
goods  or  equipment  that  would  not  be  provided  by  the  general market). Or they may be 
capital  goods  investors  who  immobilize  a  large  amount  of  money  in  the  acquisition  of 
complex  equipment  and  technologies  or  employee  training,  all  items  with  highly  delayed 
returns on costs. Consider also consumers who invest time and effort in collecting information 
on  goods  and  services  that  may  be  idiosyncratically t a i l o r e d  t o  t h e i r  p e r s o n a l  n o n -
standardized preferences, and in developing trust relationships with sellers. They expect to 
profit in the future from this knowledge and social capital investment by being furnished with 
the idiosyncratic good or service on a trust basis, which prevents them from adding  new 
information and search costs at any further purchase. All these investments attach surplus 
value to cooperation among stakeholders .  
Note that team production is usually related to the idea of the firm as a nexus of contracts 
(Alchian and Demestz, 1972) with one actor (the owner) in the special position of a central 
contracting party with discretion over terminating any particular contract without terminating 

the entire team’s life. On the unified view, these contracts must be incomplete, so that the 
owner placed at the  center of the nexus of contracts - pace Alchian and Demsetz - necessarily 
exercises authority over members of the team. In fact, s/he holds discretionary power over 
non-contractible decision variables essential for the possibility that each contracting party, 
after investing idiosyncratically in the team, may benefit from its participation.  
But consider what is meant by having residual right of control and authority over decision 
variables that concern any stakeholder’s relation with the team. According to the standard 
theory, the owner may terminate any stakeholder’s relation with the team by excluding it from 
the physical assets if it does not perform the requisite actions and relinquishes any claim over 
the surplus. Actually, this may be an oversimplification of the reasons for a formal authority 
to be able to work. However, assume that formal authority annexed to ownership in one way 
or another entails that ex-ante non-contractible decisions are resolved in the owner’s favour.  
These decision affect the surplus distribution generated by all specific investments. In brief, 
player A (the authority) will not allow player B (the non-controlling stakeholder) to benefit 
sufficiently from his/her investment to be able to repay its cost unless s/he accepts that A 
appropriates the surplus. Thus, the party holding residual control is in a position to claim the 
full surplus by expropriating other stakeholders’ returns on investments. 
Summing up, if fiduciary duties are only attached to ownership, while the non-controlling 
stakeholders are still left unprotected through incomplete contracts, then neither ownership  
nor contracts insure them against opportunism that will deprive them of any benefit deriving 
from  their  cooperation  throughout  the  firm.  Residual  control,  by  affecting  surplus 
appropriation,  can  then  generate  distribution  schemes  such  that  the  surplus  is  entirely 
appropriated  by  the  owner  no  matter  what  contribution  other  stakeholders  have  made  to 
surplus  generation  –  stakeholders  which  are  left  at t h e  l e v e l  w h e r e  t h e y  b a r e l y  c o v e r  
investments costs. This is what I call ‘abuse of authority’.  
When stakeholders are sufficiently aware of such a prospect, they will prevent this risk by not 
entering the authority relation, so that the firm does not form even if ‘team production’ could 
be  an  efficient  way  to  organize.  Alternatively,  once  they  have  entered,  stakeholders  will 
under-invest in their specific contribution (note that standard theory assumes that residual 
control is relevant for decisions that affect the possibility for an investment to achieve its goal 
when the state of world is favorable, whereas the decision to invest as such remains up to any 
single stakeholder). This is why control structures are always second best: abuse of authority 

induces some to over-invest, others to under-invest. Again a governance structure inefficiency 
is strictly connected with the expectation of unfair behaviour.  
The threat of authority abuse does not forestall the need - just for incentive reasons - of giving 
residual control to the stakeholder responsible for the most important specific investment, 
granted that by assuming the governing role he does not incur governance costs so high as to 
dissipate the wealth created by efficient investing in the assets he holds. Nevertheless this 
should  not  prevent  the  non-controlling  party  from  benefiting  fairly  form  their  specific 
investments and joint generation of surplus. Obvious here is a first reference to the Rawlsian 
maximin  principle  as  the  proper  balancing  criterion a m o n g  d i f f e r e n t  s t a k e h o l d e r s  c l a i m s .  
Owing  to  mere  incentive  reasons,  those  who  are  in  the  position  to  carry  out  the  most 
important investment must be granted the opportunity to benefit form it by holding residual 
control, which in general will induce inequalities between them and other stakeholders to the 
advantage of the former. However, since the firm is a joint venture for mutual advantage, 
disadvantaged non-controlling stakeholders must also benefit from cooperation. This grants 
them the right to veto any control structure if it is not also the better one for the worst-off 
stakeholder with respect to all the available alternatives (including also the case that they take 
over control and the disadvantaged stakeholder position is taken by some other stakeholder). 
To legitimate a unilateral control structure, wherein ownership is held by the stakeholder 
undertaking the most important investment - which also gives him the opportunity to abuse 
non-controlling  stakeholders  -  the  implementation  of  a  redress  principle  is  necessarily 
required. This entails that also the non-controlling stakeholders can reach a position better 
than those possible under any other possible control structure arrangement. My suggestion is 
therefore to understand CSR as this Rawlsian governance structure.  
When CSR is viewed as ‘extended governance’, it completes the firm as an institution for the 
governance  of  transactions  (see  Sacconi,  2000).  The f i r m ’ s  l e g i t i m a c y  d e f i c i t  ( w h a t e v e r  
category of stakeholders is placed in control of it) is remedied if the residual control right is 
accompanied by further fiduciary duties owed the subjects not controlling the firm and at risk 
of authority abuse. At the same time, this is a move towards greater social efficiency because 
it reduces the disincentives and social costs generated by the abuse of authority. From this 
perspective, ‘extended governance’ should comprise: 
•  the  residual  control  right  (ownership-based)  allocated  to  the  stakeholder  with  the 
largest investments at risk and with relatively low governance costs, as well as the 
right to delegate authority to professional directors and management; 

•  the  fiduciary  duties  of  those  who  effectively  run  the  firm  (directors  and  managers) 
towards the owners, given that these have delegated control to them; 
•  the fiduciary duties of those in a position of authority in the  firm (the controlling owner 
and/or delegated directors and managers) towards the non-controlling stakeholders, that 
is   
–  the obligation to run the firm in a manner such that these stakeholders are not 
deprived  of  their  right  to  participate  in  the  surplus  distribution  as  it  is 
cooperatively generated by their specific investments and their join actions  – so 
that the company distributes to each strict-sense-stakeholder a ‘fair share’ of the 
surplus (acceptable by whatever stakeholder in an impartial agreement), while  
the broad-sense stakeholders  are immunized against negative externalities; 
–  the duty of effective accountability to the non-controlling stakeholders in terms 
of reporting relevant information in a veracious, transparent and understandable 
way about the accomplishing of tasks related to their legitimate interests and 
rights (as defined at the previous point),  
–  and the right of these stakeholders to be represented in corporate bodies where 
they  can  exercise  effective  supervision  over  the  owner’s,  directors’    and 
managers’ compliance with their fiduciary duties – as defined to the previous two 
points  -  owed    to  non-controlling  stakeholders  (for e x a m p l e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
through  independent  members  of  a  supervisory  body  not  appointed  as 
representatives  of  shareholders  but  as  advocates  of t h e  n o n - c o n t r o l l i n g  
shareholders’ points of view).  
According  to  this  revision  of  the  corporate  governance  structure,  boards  of  directors  or 
managers appointed by owners owe a special fiduciary duty to the  ‘residual claimants’ who 
have directly delegated authority to them (via a narrow fiduciary proviso). This duty applies, 
however, only under the constraint that the more general fiduciary proviso relative to all the 
stakeholders  is  accomplished  –  which  is  specifically  defined  via  duties  owed  to  non-
controlling stakeholders.  
Moreover, the extended fiduciary duties model of corporate governance redefines the firm’s 
objective-function (more about this in Sacconi 2006a,b,, 2009). This can be reconstructed by 




(i)  Run any corporate activity in the way that minimizes negative externalities 
affecting  stakeholders  in  the  broad  sense  by  preventing  any  corporate  action  from 
bringing about not repayable damages, such as those caused to the global environment, 
or compensating them in kind as they materialize, also before any legal suit for damages 
is  started; 
(ii)  Identify the feasible set of agreements compatible with the maximization of the 
joint  surplus  and  its  simultaneous  fair  distribution,  as  established  by  the  impartial 
cooperative agreement among the stakeholders in the strict sense (more on this in the 
Part II); 
(iii)  If more than one option is available in the above-defined feasible set, choose 
the one that maximizes the residual allocated to owners (for example, the shareholders). 
 
The  rest  of  this  essay  concentrates  on  an  argument in favor of this extended governance 
structure and objective-function, taking seriously (at least from the abstract perspective of 
game theory) the challenge that any proposal for reform must prove to be implementable.  
4       CSR as an ‘equilibrium institution’ based on the social contract of the 
firm. 
A  common  tenet  concerning  CSR  is  that  it  should  go  beyond  what  can  be  required  of 
companies by statutory laws and that it involves a certain degree of voluntarism and self-
regulation. However, discretion is quite different from effective self-regulation, in that it does 
not entail any rule (either internal or external, enforced or self-enforced, legal or moral). 
Moreover, self-regulation may be understood in rather different ways: (i) as the case of an 
organism  (the  firm)  endowed  with  its  own  ‘natural’  (so  to  speak  ‘unchosen’)  internal 
regularity of functioning, whereby its behavior is completely endogenously directed, without 
any need for interaction with other agents,  either to agree on or at least to abide by any social 
norm at any time; or (ii) as the output of an agreement (explicit or implicit) among individual 
members of  more or less extensive social groups - whereby they establish and adhere to an 
expressed  (in  language)  set  of  principles  or  rules, w i t h  a  n o r m a t i v e  c o n t e n t  t h a t  t h e y  
understand  and  which  gives  them  guidance  by  vetoing s o m e  a c t i o n s  a n d  r e c o m m e n d i n g  
others, such a rule is not enforced by any external authority imposing sanctions because this is 
instead performed through the voluntary adherence of the individual members of the relevant 

social group to the principles expressed (Posner, 2000). The self-regulatory nature of CSR is 
here understood in accordance with  the second view. In particular, let us state the following 
definition of a CSR effective self-regulation (Clarkson, 1999; Sacconi, De Colle and Baldin, 
2003; Wieland 2003):  
a)  CSR is established by social norms such as multi-stakeholder governance codes and 
management standards, not merely managerial discretionary decisions; 
b)  These include normative utterances: general abstract principles and preventive rules of 
behaviour  concerning  fiduciary  duties,  general  statements  of  the  fair  treatment 
principle for each company stakeholder, principles of inter-stakeholder justice and fair 
balancing,  precautionary  rules  of  behaviour  in  any  critical  sphere  of  potentially 
opportunistic  behaviour  between  the  firm  and  some  of  its  stakeholders  -  so  that 
fiduciary duties and related rights are put in practice by standard precautionary rules 
of conduct that pre-empt opportunistic behaviour in typical critical situations; 
c)  Such norms are agreed upon by both firms and stakeholders through (voluntary) forms 
of multi-stakeholder social dialog (which simulates the idea of a ‘small scale social 
contract’ among them);  
d)  Nevertheless, these normative contents and standards of behaviour are self-imposed 
by firms on themselves without external legal enforcement, but instead by means of 
the  internal  adoption  of  statutes  and  codes  of  ethics  reshaping  the  corporate 
governance  and  participatory  structures,  self-organization,  training,  auditing  and 
control, which are compatible with voluntariness at  the corporate level; and only on 
the basis of the consequences that non-conformity my induce for the stakeholders/firm 
interaction; 
e)  The previous self-enforcement approach does not prevent self-regulation from being 
monitored and verified by third-party independent civil society bodies (which do not 
have conflicts of interest with their mission of impartial overview over companies 
voluntarily subjected to self-regulation); this enhances the level of information and 
knowledge whereby stakeholders define their expectations about the firm’s conduct. 
By  contrast,  this  monitoring,  verification  and  rating  of  conformity  levels  may  be 
strictly necessary due to the typical information conditions wherein CSR social norms 
and standards are established.   
 

Of course, effective CSR self-regulation is a viable option only within an institutional and 
legal environment that does not obstruct it. Such obstruction would occur in the case of too 
narrow definitions of the firm’s objective-function such as that prescribing shareholder value 
maximization as the company’s only goal – as today to be found in many company laws at 
international  level
If maximizing the joint stakeholder value conflicted even in the very 
short  run  with  immediate  shareholder  value  maximization,  these  laws  would  prevent  the 
board from deciding to balance stakeholders’ interests according to the social contract view, 
which  implies  a  constrained  maximization  view  (that i s ,  c o n s t r a i n i n g  s h a r e h o l d e r  v a l u e  
maximization with the condition of the simultaneous ma ximi za tio n  o f  o th e r  sta k e h o ld e r s’  
utility according to a bargaining solution) (for more on this, see Sacconi 2006a,b, 2009).   
This is a good reason (in order properly to assess the implementation and stability of a CSR 
norm) to admit a sort of hypothetical ‘state of nature’ benchmarking into the assessment of 
institutions. It logically precedes historical legal constructs that without necessity may legally 
obstruct by design (or due to contingent historical equilibrium paths) the emergence of such a 
normative model. Thus, admitted that company laws do not obstruct proper self-regulation, 
the thrust of my argument is that the endogenous beliefs, motivations and preferences of 
economic  agents  (companies  and  stakeholders)  are  the  essential  forces  driving  the 
implementation of the CSR model of multi-stakeholder governance. If this is true, there will 
be a plenty of reasons - not only normative but also from the incentive compatibility and 
stability  viewpoints  -  to  promote  reforms  that  enable  companies  to  adopt  governance 
structures, management systems and organization designs consistent with the CSR model.   
Making  sense  of  CSR  as  a  self-regulatory  explicit  social  norm  requires  a  definition  of 
institution different from simple consideration of existing formal-legal orderings. Here Aoki’s 
shared-beliefs cum equilibrium-summary-representation view of institutions seems to furnish 
an essential part of the appropriate institution concept. According to this view, an institution is  
“a self-sustaining system of shared beliefs about a salient way in which the game is repeatedly 
played” which is a rule not in the sense of “rules exogenously given by the polity, culture or a 
meta-game”, but in the alternative sense of “rules as being endogenously created through the 
strategic interaction of agents, held in the minds of agents and thus self-sustaining - as the 
equilibrium-of-the-game theorist do. In order for beliefs to be shared by agents in a self-
sustaining manner (….) and regarded by them as relevant  (…)  the content of the shared 
beliefs” must be “a summary representation (compressed information) of an equilibrium of 
the game (out of the many that are theoretically possible).  That is to say a salient feature of 

an  equilibrium  may  be  tacitly  recognized  by  agent  or  have  corresponding  symbolic 
representation inside the minds of agents and coordinate their beliefs” (Aoki, 2001, p.11) 
The  self-enforceability  condition  of  Nash  equilibria  is  implicit  in the  above  definition.  A 
compressed  summary  representation o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  w a y  a  g a m e  h a s  b e e n  
repeatedly  and  regularly  played  is  not  a  complete  description  of  all  the  histories  of  the 
repeated game under any contingency. Nevertheless, it is a summarizing pattern (a model 
resident within the players’ minds, i.e. a mental model) containing salient features of the 
players’ equilibrium action profile that has been played in the game so far and which are 
sufficient to define reciprocal expectations and beliefs concerning each other’s actions from 
now on. Given this mental compressed representation, boundedly rational players – without 
complete information - derive beliefs about how any other player currently plays the repeated 
game.  And  these  beliefs  are  shared -  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  a n y  t w o  p l a y e r s  m a k e  t h e  s a m e  
prediction about any other player involved - and consistent – in the sense that beliefs whereby 
any player derives his choice also cohere with his prediction of beliefs whereby other players 
derive their choices. These beliefs replicate the prediction that a particular equilibrium will be 
played among the many possible, and it is from such beliefs that all players derive their best 
actions. Because these actions are best against beliefs, and these beliefs correctly summarize 
current behaviors, these actions are also the best responses to the other players’ actual actions 
as these are represented by beliefs. Then the derived action profile satisfies the typical Nash 
equilibrium condition.  
This clarifies why the belief system is self-sustaining. The resulting equilibrium profile, as it 
is  generated  by  best  responses  to  beliefs,  also  replicates  the  same  behavior  that  the 
compressed  information  summary  in  fact  represents  - i . e .  i t  e x h i b i t s  t h e  s a m e  s a l i e n t  
characteristics as summarized in that compressed information representation. Hence, it cannot 
but replicate the same summarized information on how the game is played, and hence support 
the same beliefs system.  
The beliefs /compressed information summary representation pair is an institution not in the 
sense of a ‘rule of the game’ exogenously imposed on the players’ choices by some physical 
or technological feature of the environment, or by any further external institution or authority. 
These rules are useful to define the game form, that is, the objective set of  constraints and 
opportunities  within  which  the  game  is  played.  But  the  beliefs / compressed  information 
summary representation pair instead defines an institution as the endogenous rule of behavior 
emerging from how the game is played. In fact, given the game form, the beliefs sy stem 

describes a regularity of behavior resulting form the players’ choices that they represent in 
their minds and replicate in response to that representation. Thus the belief system replicates 
itself endogenously.   
An  important  consequence  of  Aoki’s  view  is  the  following.  A  statutory  law  passed  by  a  
parliament or another legislative body, even though it may explicitly settle rights and duties, if 
there is no shared belief that it will be complied with by those who ‘should’, it is not to be 
considered an institution. Instead, the ongoing practice of violating the statutory law could be 
considered the ‘true’ institution of the relevant action domain (Aoki, 2001). 
Nevertheless, at first glance, this definition has a major drawback. Institutions thus defined 
seem  to  be  devoid  of  any  significant  normative  meaning  and  force.  On  the  contrary, 
institutions like constitutions or laws, ethical codes, shared social values, organizational codes 
of conduct and procedures have primarily a prescriptive meaning (in the case of ethics such 
meaning requires “universalizability” (Hare, 1981)) -  i.e.  they are  action guides and not just 
description of state of affairs. They tell agents what must not be done or what is to be done in 
different  circumstances. Institutions in the above game-theoretical  definition  may  seem  to 
give  an  indication  about  the  best  action  of  each  player  only  ex  post -  t h a t  i s ,  o n c e  t h e  
participants  have  chosen  their  actions  and  have  shared  knowledge  that  they  have  already 
reached an equilibrium state in their choices. The institution (beliefs system and the relative 
compressed information representation) tells players only to maintain the existing pattern of 
behavior because it is an equilibrium supporting the existing beliefs system. An institution 
such as this seems to have no normative content. It is based on a summary of how the game 
has been played in the past and consists of a set of mutually consistent predictions of how the 
game is currently being played and will be played in the future.  
But why then would institutions be as they are? Why would they contain principles and norms 
(moral, legal, social or organizational) explicitly formulated in sentences through  utterances 
whose meaning is not mainly a description of how people normally act (even though they can 
also contain descriptions) but a prescription of how they must  or must not behave. There is no 
reason why what the addressee must do according to a norm corresponds to what - before the 
utterance of these prescriptive sentence - s/he de facto does. A norm (as a component of an 
institution) is not falsified by the observation that people do not conform to it, even though it 
can be thus recognized as ineffective (and discarded as an institution in the proper sense). The 
point is that a  necessary  component of the belief system defining an institutions must not 
merely  replicate  the  description  of  behavior  in  a  given  action  domain;  it  must  instead 

prescribe it independently of the description of the ongoing course of action. In other word, it 
rests  on  some  a  priori s t a n d p o i n t .  A r g u a b l y ,  t h i s  i s  a  necessary t h o u g h  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  
condition for an institution to exist (for sufficiency, the beliefs equilibrium definition must be 
met).  
Moreover, a norm is sometimes explicitly introduced in order to change the received behavior 
and to set up an institutions that can regulate a given domain of actions. It thus provides 
guidance  for  action  choices  in  the  given  domain  when the players’ summary  compressed 
representation of information about how they have acted cannot replicate the required change. 
Because  it  is  a  theory  of  institutional  change,  Aoki’s  theory  provides  an  answer  to  this 
question. The problem under consideration is twofold:  
(i)  the  problem  of  equilibrium  selection  within  a  given g a m e  f o r m ,  w h e r e  a n  o l d  
equilibrium path (old institution) has been abandoned for whatever reason and a new 
equilibrium path (new institution) has to be reached by all the players even though it 
has not yet been stabilized among them; and secondly  
(ii)  the problem of achieving such a new equilibrium actions profile supported by a stable 
and shared beliefs system (a new institution), when the underly ing action domain  
changes because environmental or technological changes have been introduced, or 
some further action opportunity is simply discovered by players and represented for 
the first time in their subjective mental model of the game.   
To  these  distinct  but  interlocked  questions  Aoki  gives  an  answer  based  on  the  idea  of 
‘salience’  of  some  game  feature,  which  is  not  understood  as  mere  description  of  a 
characteristic. That is to say, it is not confined to the condition that  players’ beliefs contain 
the description of a salient characteristic of how they have acted in the past and that they 
transfer into a prediction of how they will act  in  the future. Here, the genuine guidance 
function of a normative beliefs system emerges. And it is part of the explanation of why that 
beliefs system is  widely accepted by every  participant in the  action domain, so that it is 
recognized as ‘salient’ or ‘prominent’ – i.e. so that everybody knows that also others accept it 
and use it to assess each other’s behavior. It thus gives players reasons to coordinate (so to 
speak ‘for the first time’) on a specific equilibrium profile inter alia, given that many are 
possible,  also  in  cases  when  the  domain  of  action  changes  or  is  enriched  by  new 
opportunities.  
“The point is that some symbolic system of predictive/normative beliefs [emphasis added] 
precedes the evolution of a new equilibrium and then becomes accepted by all the agents in 

the relevant domain through their experiences. It could be ‘unsettled culture or ideologies – 
explicit  articulated  highly  organized  meaning  systems  –  that  may  establish  new  styles  or 
strategies  of  actions  (…),    ‘an  entrepreneur’s  vision  that  may  trigger  certain  action  that 
eventually  remove  the  limits  of  organizational  capabilities  and  environmental  constraints’ 
(…)  or  even  the  political  program  of  a  subversive  political  party  (…)  bounded  rational 
individual agents form their own subjective models of the game that they play” (…) so that  
the  mechanism  of  institutional  change  is  seen  “a  process  of  revision,  refinement  and 
inducement if mutual consistency of such model incorporating a (common) representation 
system” (ibid. p. 19)  
These examples of symbolic systems of normative and predictive beliefs are introduced as 
possible  empirical  explanations  of  how  an  equilibrium  may  become  focal  before  it  is 
stabilized by customary behaviors and beliefs.  Clearly,  however,  this  view  presumes  that 
these beliefs exercise a justificatory force able to induce the general acceptance of a new 
equilibrium  in a given domain, so that - but only later on - it becomes the ‘salient’ basis for  
reciprocal prediction of all of the participants’ actions.  
Thus, a second component of a proper definition of institution – integrating Aoki’s definition 
- is the mental representation of a norm, necessarily expressed by utterances in the players’ 
language (oral, written or simply mentally represented) concerning rights and duties, values 
and obligations, which needs to have a prescriptive and universalizable meaning able to justify 
its shared acceptance by all participants in a given interaction domain.  Because it is ex ante 
accepted by all players, it enters their shared mental model (Dezau and North, 1994) of how 
the game should be played and hence becomes the basis for their coordination on a specific 
equilibrium under a given action domain. The key point is then explaining how a normative 
system  of  beliefs,  preceding  the  evolution  of  the  corresponding  equilibrium,  becomes 
accepted by all agents in the relevant domain. And to be useful for the purposes of this essay, 
this explanation should make sense of  a CSR norm accepted by all the corporate stakeholders 
and those in the position of authority in the firm. 
To  my  knowledge,  the  best  justificatory  account  for n o r m s  o n  r e s p o n s i b l e  e x e r c i s e  o f  
authority, entailing ex ante shared acceptance, is the social contract model. Contractarian 
norms result from a voluntary agreement in an hypothetical original choice situation which 
logically comes before any exogenous institution is over-imposed on a given action domain, 
or before any institution (in the equilibrium sense) has yet emerged. Thus a norm (and the 
institution that may encapsulate it) arises and can be maintained only because of the voluntary 

agreement and adhesion of agents. To define the agreement on a justifiable norm, any social 
contract model sets aside threats, fraud and manipulation resources that would render the 
parties substantially unequal in terms of bargaining power. Besides the normative reason for 
doing so, such initial conditions would need an explanation in terms of a previously reached 
equilibrium in a game of threats played in the relevant domain, or it would be seen as the 
effect of institutions already existing in some adjacent domain that give some players more 
strength than others. The hypothetical choice under the original position proceeds as if these 
contingencies were arbitrary and irrelevant to the proper calculation of the social contract.  
The idea of a ‘fair agreement’ thus becomes intuitive: the agreement must reflect only each 
participant’s  rational  autonomy,  decision-making  freedom  and  intentionality,  which  are 
assumed to be equal in weight among the participants in the contract. (This can be disputed 
on an empirical basis, but in principle the idea is to skip any morally irrelevant difference 
among participants). The agreement thus gives equal consideration and respect – i.e. equal 
treatment - to reasons, interests and decisions put forward by each participant in the contract, 
because  a  voluntary  and  unanimous  agreement  among  autonomous  choosers  necessarily 
equally reflects the reasons to enter the agreement by each and all of them. 
It is not only the initial creation of norms and institutions that is seen by the social contract 
model  as  a  matter  of  unanimous  agreement  among  autonomous  agents.  Also  their 
implementation is understood as being a matter of voluntary adhesion. Thus the endogeneity 
of institutions with respect to the agents’ strategic interaction is respected at both stages: an 
institution is endogenous to the ex ante players’ strategic interaction understood as rational 
bargaining among equally situated rational agents, i.e. it can be started only by the unanimous 
individual  players’  decision  to  enter  a  voluntary  agreement.  Moreover,  the  ex  post 
implementation  of  an  institutional  arrangement  is  also  seen  as  the  composition  of  the 
autonomous decisions that players make in their strategic interaction,  whereby they chose 
whether or not to comply with the social contract by carrying out decisions that reflect the 
whole set of their reasons and motives to act.  
In order to accomplish these tasks, the social contract model must operate in two different but 
necessarily  related directions. Entering ex ante a n d  a d h er in g  ex post to the ag reement on 
principles and norms for institutions are distinct decision problems, with quite different logics 
of choice, but which nevertheless must be solved in a mutually consistent way and within a 
unified view. The choice of entering the contract must provide a justification for norms and 
institutions.  The  form  of  this  justification  is  the i m p a r t i a l  r a t i o n a l  a g r e e m e n t  o f  a l l  t h e  

concerned stakeholders. It is appropriate here to give weight only to considerations relevant to 
the rational decision to enter an impartial agreement, which is provisionally assumed to be 
possible since all the parties involved are hypothetically assumed to voluntarily participate in 
a  thought  experiment.  Hence  preventing  cheating  and  defection  is  not  the  focus  of  the 
decision logic employed to calculate the agreement, even though these considerations may be 
essential in defining the feasible outcome set from which the agreement should be selected. 
What is relevant here is the opportunity offered by an unanimous agreement to improve to 
mutual advantage the state of affairswith respect to  the “state of nature” that would result from 
cooperation  failure.  Moreover,  such  a  mutual  improvement  and  advantage  must  itself  be 
recognized as acceptable by equally autonomous, free and rational participants in the bargain 
– so that it must not only be mutual in the sense that whatever improvement one party gains 
over the state of nature status quo necessarily corresponds to some improvement in another’s. 
In addition, it must also treat participants symmetrically, so that they can accept such an 
agreement proposal of mutual advantage form an impartial standpoint.  
Quite different is the decision logic of the compliance problem. When we move from the ex 
ante to the ex post perspective, we ask whether an agreement reached can also be complied 
with by the same players who agreed on it. This is a different problem because the game-logic 
of compliance differs from that of entering a cooperative agreement. It is instead the logic of 
an ex post non-cooperative game in which the players decide separately but interdependently 
whether or not to comply with the ex ante agreed contract. From this perspective, the question 
is not so much whether the contract provides reasonably high joint benefits and distributes 
them in an acceptably fair way; rather, the question is mainly whether there are incentives for 
cheating on the counterparty to the agreement, given the expectation that s/he will abide by 
the contract.  
Social contract models convincingly answer the ex ante decision problem, but are typically  at 
odds with the compliance problem. This difficulty also applies to the most elaborate social 
contract theories that have made significant steps toward a unified view of both aspects. (See 
Rawls  (1971) and Gauthier  (1986). Binmore also provides a unified view of the two problem 
according to the social contract model (see extensively Part II of this essay). On the other 
hand, Aoki’s institution definition guarantees that, if the agreed norm is represented within 
the players’ minds by summary information about a “salient” equilibrium profile and thus 
generates a system of predictive and normative beliefs, then also the compliance problem is 
amenable to solution, since it will satisfy the equilibrium condition. Thus, taking jointly the 

two requirements - (i) acceptability of the normative content of an institution through a social 
contract,  and (ii) a shared belief system based on the compressed representation summary of 
an equilibrium - seems to provide the comprehensive definition of institution needed here.  
There are many different accounts of the social contract model. For example, both Rawls’ and 
Gauthier’ accounts are compatible with what has been said thus far. However, Rawls’s idea of 
the original position is basic to the purpose of this essay. It is a choice condition requiring 
unanimous agreement  under a ‘veil of ignorance’ concerning any detail of each participant’s  
personal identity and social position. To be clear, I  mean by  a ‘veil of ignorance’ radical 
uncertainty about the mappings that would identify each participant in the original position 
with a particular set of personal attributes such as strategies and payoffs that would represent 
his  personal  characteristics  and  social  position  under  different  contingencies.  The  veil  of 
ignorance  creates  an  impersonal  and  impartial  standpoint  whereby  an  agreement  is 
unanimously workable because each participant’s separate standpoint becomes identical with 
that of all the others. In other words, behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ each individual is ready to 
take symmetrically the position of any other and to replace his/her initial personal standpoint 
with  that  of  everybody  else.  Under  these  symmetrical  exchanges  of  position,  whereby 
everyone  assesses  acceptance  of  any  given  set  of  normative  statements,  they  reach  an 
agreement that reflects a reasonable impartial combination of all the reasons to act that they 
consider  in  turn.  Importantly,  the  agreement  accepted  by  each  of  them  cannot  but  be 
unanimous, for the symmetrical replacement of personal positions is carried out in identical 
ways by all the involved parties, so that they are identically situated in their  exercise of 
institutional assessment.  
Thus, it is the agreement under the veil of ignorance among all the corporate stakeholders that 
should  generate the shared acceptance of CSR as a social norm corresponding to a particular 
equilibrium among the many possible. Since it is a “thought experiment”, it  would impress 
the players’ minds with a  mental model of how the game should be played and generate an 
identical ‘salient’ aspect of their interaction that would favor effective coordination over a 
specific equilibrium point to be played by the choice of each actions. When the shared system 
of mutually consistent beliefs has been formed for the first time, it will allow for mutual 
predictions and the generation of an equilibrium that also confirms the same beliefs set. The 
summary  information  compressed  into  a  mental  representation  of  the  regular  players’ 
behavior  throughout  the  repetition  of  the  game,  generated  by  ex  ante  acceptance  of  the 
normative beliefs that a particular equilibrium is to be played, can then be understood as an 

institution. Now argued is that CSR is the social norm in the corporate governance domain 
that satisfies this definition.   
A social contract explanation is a zero–level explanation which in fact assumes as its starting 
point  the  “state  of  nature”  hypothesis.  It  is  more  fundamental  than,  and  prior  to,  any 
consideration  of  complementarities  between  a  CSR  model  of  corporate  governance  and 
institutions belonging to different domains. And it also logically precedes any assessment of 
how institutional changes in other domains – such as labor law, the industrial relation system, 
or in general the political system - may ease the introduction of CSR. In fact, assume that a 
social  contract  among  all  the  company  stakeholders  induces  them  to  build  CSR  as  an 
institution which is not only impartially acceptable to stakeholders but also self-sustainable - 
admitted that it is neither obstructed by prohibitions in the legal system nor incentivized by 
other institutions or regulations. Such a normative model  is the natural candidate for a legal 
reform  of  statutory  company  laws  and  corporate  governance  regulations  because  it  has 
already proved to have endogenous forces of its own pushing toward its institution


5   The four roles of a social contract on CSR norms 

To understand why the stakeholders’ social contract on a CSR norm explicitly stated through 
utterances in normative language is so essential for the endogeneity and self-sustainability of 
the corresponding behavior and expectations (e.g. an institution in Aoki’s sense), we must 
consider the roles performed by voluntarily agreed explicit norms. But let us first model the 
relationships between the firm and each of its stakeholders as a case of the well-known trust 
game ( T G )  –  a  f o r m a l  c o n t e x t  w h e r e i n  t h e s e  r o l e s  c a n  b e  b e t t e r  s i t u a t e d  ( s e e  f i g .  5 . 1 )  
(Fudenberg and Levine, 1989; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). A stakeholder A may or may not 
enter into a specific relationship with the firm. The firm is here identified with the particular 
stakeholder B who owns its physical assets and hence exercises control on some discretionary 
decision variables that affect the mutual opportunity to profit from the stakeholder’s A (and 
maybe his/her own) specific investment and cooperative decision to enter the relationship. 
Hence, in the trust game, what stakeholder A may or may not enter is a fiduciary relation with 
those in a position of control (synthetically called ‘the firm’). By entering, it is assumed that 
the stakeholder A makes a specific investment that renders his/her relationship with the firm 
idiosyncratic, but also makes possible a surplus deriving form this relationship. On the other 
hand, the position of the firm’s owner in the game makes explicit the possibility that s/he may 

abuse his/her authority toward the non-controlling stakeholder. The owner may or may not 
abuse the stakeholder’s trust. In the case of abuse, the owner appropriates all the surplus 
generated by specific investments and gets 3, leaving the stakeholder with only the cost of its 
investment (-1). If the owner does not abuse, there is a mutually beneficial sharing of the 
surplus for both the players (2, 2) that reflects their joint contribution to ‘team production’. As 
well  known,    this  game  has  a  single  Nash  equilibrium,  the  Pareto-inefficient  outcome 
corresponding to the payoffs vector (0, 0). Since the firm B will necessarily abuse (‘abuse’ is 
its dominant strategy), the stakeholder A will not enter.   
                            
          
                
                 
                                      
 
                     
              
 
Fig. 1  One shot Trust Game in extensive form 

But matters may substantially change if the TG is infinitely repeated between a single long-
run  player  B,  in  the  institutional  role  of  the  firm,  and  an  infinite  series  of  short-run 
stakeholders  seen  as  players  A1,…,An ( w h e r e  n  g o e s  t o  i n f i n i t y ) .  A t  e a c h  s t a g e  g a m e  
(repetition) a player in the role of Ai has a short-run strategy choice at hand: whether or not to 
enter, given the consideration of the previous story of how the game has been played until the 
stage where s/he is required to make his/her decision. On the other side, the long-run B player 
has to make a choice among long-run strategies which at each repetition select a concrete 
action  (abuse,  not  abuse  or  a  random  mechanism  to  mix  the  two  probabilistically)  as  a 
function of the story of the game until each possible stage. Note that because B chooses at 
each stage, a long-run player’s strategy is a rule for making such selection at each stage given 
any story of the game at whatever  stage. Thus, a long-run strategy considered as a whole 
accounts for every possible story of whatever length according to which the game might have 
been played at each stage. As a consequence, each mono-periodical short-run stakeholder Ai 
(for whatever value of i) has a payoff function defined on the outcome of the specific stage at 
which s/he participate in the game. Otherwise the long-run player B’s payoff function is the 
entry (e)
no-entry (¬ ¬¬¬ e)
abuse (a)







infinite summation of each payoff s/he gets at any stage multiplied by a discount factor δ  (0 < 
δ < 1) reflecting player B’s impatience or short-sightedness. Under convenient conditions, 
such a payoff is the limit of the mean payoff associated with the loop of whatever length 
(going to infinity) into which player A’s strategy enters again and again along its repetition, 
given the short-run players’ strategy choices (i.e. loops generating identical series of stage 
game payoffs).  Let us assume that the discount factor δ is not ‘too small’ with respect to the 
ratio between (i) how much player B in a single case forgoes by not abusing player Ai instead 
of  taking  the  opportunity  to  exploit  him/her,    and  (ii)  how  much  s/he  forgoes  at  each 
successive stage by receiving the payoff associated with non-entrance by player Ai instead of 
the payoff of mutual cooperation.  
The game is qualified as ‘incomplete information game’ in a distinct sense. Short-run players 
Ai are uncertain about player B’s rationality (i.e. criterion of choice) so that they take as 
possible different player B types, where types identify the long-run strategies played by B. 
This is to be understood in the sense that players A1,…, An take it for granted that player B is 
irrevocably committed or disposed to play some specific behavior rule - which consists of a 
specific repeated strategy - but is also uncertain about what among the many possible such 
commitments is. Thus player B is deemed to be a not completely strategically rational agent 
because s/he would stick to a rule of behavior independently of player A’s choice. This is 
only  the  way  that  players  A1,…An t h i n k  a b o u t  t h e  g a m e ,  h o w e v e r .  I n d e e d ,  p l a y e r  B  i s  
nevertheless completely strategically rational and informed, so that s/he will decide his/her 
strategy without any sense of absolute commitment, and only on the basis of his/her best 
prediction  of  strategy  choice  by  players  A1,…,An.  This  in  turn  is  based  on  his/her 
understanding  of how the short-run players’ beliefs change from one repetition of the game 
to the next.  
Player B’s reputations are the probabilities attached by players Ai at each stage to B’s types, 
whereas types are stereotyped commitments on player B’s rules of play (strategies). Changes 
in reputations are a function of the repeated observation of how stages games? have been 
played  by  B,  and  of  the  stage  game  outcomes  and  their  comparison  with  what  a  given 
commitment would have entailed  (contingently on also the behavior of players Ai). Each 
player Ai is assumed to update by means of the Bayes rule the initial probabilistic beliefs 
shared by all players Ai concerning player B’s types. Repeated observations of ‘not abuse’ 
will augment the ex post probability of any B’s strategy (pure or mixed) that does not abuse at 
all or abuses very slightly. Whereas such observations will falsify the hypothesis that player B 

is the abusive type, or they will reduce the probability of any significantly abusive B’s mixed 
type. Player B supports his/her reputation of being a given type by continuing to play stage 
game moves  which are consistent with the type.   
Under these not innocuous assumptions it is well known that a whole set of new equilibria 
becomes possible in the repeated trust game. In particular this set of equilibria (consisting  of 
repeated short-run strategies chosen by players A1,…,An paired with a long-run player  B’s 
strategy) is bounded from above by the equilibrium wherein player B plays his Stackelberg 
strategy, and from below by the  equilibrium in which  no  player  in  the  role  of  A1 enters 
throughout the game repetition. (Fudenberg and Levine, 1986; see also Fudenberg and Tirole, 
1991). It is important for understanding how spontaneous cooperation can arise between the 
firm  and  its  stakeholder  that  if  only  pure  strategies  are  considered,  then  a  repeated  B’s 
decision not  to abuse will eventually induce entrance by every short-run player Ai (after some 
periods spent on accumulating reputation). If the discount factor is not too low, continuing to 
play no abuse is also player B’s best response, so that repeated non-abuse and substantial 
entrance  by  players  Ai w i l l  b e  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  o f  t h e  g a m e .  T h i s  i s  t h e  t y pical  ‘good 
reputation’  equilibrium  which  is  typically  advocated  by  those  who  are  ‘optimistic’  about 
spontaneous cooperation between the firm and its stakeholder.  
Against the background of this concise representation of the stakeholder/firm interaction, we 
may understand the four roles of a social contract on a CSR norm expressing player B’s 
fiduciary  obligation not to abuse player A’s trust.  
•  The cognitive-constructive role, which answers the question about how the firm works 
out the set of commitments that it can undertake with respect to generic states of the world 
that it is aware of not being able to predict in any detail, and therefore what types of possible 
equilibrium behavior the firm can work out so that stakeholders may entertain expectations 
about them; 
•  The  normative  role,  which  answers  the  question  about  what  (if  any)  pattern  of 
interaction the firm and its stakeholders must a priori select from the set of possible equilibria 
to be carried out ex post (according to the answer given to question a), if they adopt an ex ante 
standpoint  (‘under  the  veil  of  ignorance’)  enabling a n  a g r e e m e n t  t o  b e  r e a c h e d  f r o m  a n  
impartial  point of view; 
•  The  motivational  role,  which  answers  the  question  about  what a n d  how  many 
equilibrium patterns of behaviors, amongst those that may emerge ex post from the interaction 

between firm and stakeholder, would retain their motivational force if firm and stakeholder 
were able to agree in an ex ante perspective on a CSR norm  along the lines of question (b); 
•  The cognitive-predictive role concerning how the ex ante agreement on a CSR norm 
affects t h e  b e l i e f s  f o r m a t i o n  p r o c e s s ,  w h e r e b y  a  f i r m  a n d  its  stakeholders  cognitively 
converge on a system of mutually consistent expectations such that they reciprocally predict 
from  each other the execution of a given equilibrium in their ex post interaction (given that 
more than one equilibrium point still retains motivational force). The question to be answered 
by this function is ‘does the norm shape the expectation formation process so that in the end it 
will coincide with what the ex ante agreed principle would require of firm and stakeholders?’ 

6   The cognitive /constructive role of the social contract 

The second role is the focus of the part II of this essay, where the main contribution of the 
Rawlsian view is discussed (see Sacconi 2010, infra). I have  discussed at length the first role 
elsewhere (Sacconi 2000, 2006a, 2007b, 2008), so here I may briefly summarize the main 
argument with reference to the repeated trust game.  
To enable the reputation cumulative process, the firm should commit to a strategy  carried out 
with  specific  unambiguous  and  verifiable  actions  at e a c h  s t a g e  g a m e  a c c o r d i n g  t o  a  
conditional rule. The stage game choice induced by a strategy is specified with respect to 
every possible story of the game, that is with respect to all the possible state of the world 
wherein the game has been  played till the current stage, for whatever stage. This means that, 
given a player B’s strategy, every player Ai at any stage t is capable to predict how player B 
will play at any stage (given any previous possible story).   
Consider, however, that modeling the firm like this entails assuming a context of incomplete 
contracts,  which  we  interpret  in  its  genuine  nature a s  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  u n f o r e s e e n  a n d  
unforeseeable  states  of  the  world  (Kreps,  1992).  Complete  contracts  between  two  parties 
would be agreements on pairs of contingent strategies, one for each party. In our case these 
would at least make it possible to say how the firm will act in whatever state of the world that 
may unfold through all the game repetitions. With contract incompleteness, by contrast, some 
states  of  the  world  are  unforeseen.  Hence  it  is  impossible  ex  ante  to  define  how  any 
contingent s t r a t e g y  w i l l  b e h a v e  w h e n  a n  u n f o r e s e e n  s t a t e  o f  t he  world  arises  at  some 
repetition  of  the  game.  In  fact,  under  incomplete  knowledge,  contingent  contractual 

commitments are mute, or not even specified, on the unforeseen states, and this implies that 
also commitments to specific contingent strategies that the firm B may undertake toward its 
stakeholders Ai will be unspecified.  
But a type’s reputation crucially depends on verification of the correspondence between the 
game outcome in a given state and the commitment to be fulfilled by the type in the same 
state, which entails an expected outcome for that state under the given type (also contingent 
on player Ai’s choice). When a state of the world is unforeseen, a concrete contingent strategy 
cannot be ex ante specified as to its possible occurrence. Thus no contingent commitment can 
ex ante be undertaken with respect to unknown states of the world. From this it follows is that 
there is no basis for saying whether “what had to be done has been done” (Kreps, 1990). 
Commitments are emptied by cognitive gaps in relation to states that stakeholders and the 
firm cannot ex ante concretely describe. These cognitive gaps give no basis for reputation as 
modelled  as  the  probabilistic  updating  of  initial  beliefs  associated  with  commitments 
calculated in function of stage-by-stage observation of whether or not actions prescribed by 
commitments are performed at any stage of the game.  
In more general terms, the problem is essentially one of incomplete specification of the game 
form a n d  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  o f  t h e  s t r a t e g y  s e t  ( t y p e  s e t )  a nd  outcome  functions  (which  map 
strategy combinations to payoffs for each state of the world at each stage). But without types 
uniquely related to commitments to strategies, no reputation effects are possible. Thus an  
“existence  of  the  equilibrium”  problem  arises.  Players  cannot  calculate  the  equilibrium 
strategies of the reputation game because their commitments are unspecified with respect to 
unforeseen  states  of  the  worlds.  Put  differently,  they  lapse  into  a  state  of  cognitive 
unawareness of the equilibrium strategies that would support any level of mutual cooperation 
amongst the players.   
The picture changes if the social contract has been introduced ex ante on a norm understood 
as the firm’s constitution stating its fiduciary duties toward all the stakeholders in terms of 
general and abstract principles and precautionary rules of behavior. It predefines the standard 
conducts to be carried out if some principle is put at risk of violation by the occurrence of 
whatever  (even  if  unforeseen)  state  of  the  world.  What  is  crucial  here  is  that  the  social 
contract introduces explicit norms (general and abstract principles and precautionary rules of 
behavior)  that  are  established  without  ex  ante  complete knowledge of all future states of 
affairs. In general, this is the role of constitutional principles in legal orders, and specifically 
the role of universalizable principles in ethical codes.  

Once a social contract has been introduced, there will be universalizable, general and abstract 
principles and precautionary rules of behavior to which stakeholders and the firm have agreed 
without being contingent on any concrete and complete ex ante description of future states of 
affairs;  and  these  principles  can  be  taken  as  benchmarks with which to assess the firm’s 
behavior  also when unforeseen states arise (as Kreps suggested concerning corporate culture 
principles but mistakenly restricted them to cultures rather than to ethics, see Kreps, 1992 and  
Sacconi, 2000). In so far as the agreement is worked out through counterfactual reasoning 
under  a  hypothetical  original  choice  situation,  and c o n c e r n s  g e n e r a l  a n d  a b s t r a c t  
universalizable principles - by definition independent from any concrete description of details 
about the players’ positions and any other concrete contingency – the principles agreed are 
adaptable to a wide array of situations. The social contract thus plays a cognitive role as a gap 
filling device (Coleman, 1992) which establishes the types of behaviors that stakeholders can 
expect from the firm in situations where contracts fail owing to the absence of conditional 
provisos constraining residual decisions.  
This  cognitive  function  is  primarily  constructive.  The  game  form  (Aoki,  2007)  is  badly 
specified  under  unforeseen  situations,  because  contingent  strategies  for  such  states  are 
unspecified. Norms nevertheless allow a default inference to be made on how the honest type 
of firm will behave under these circumstances. These ‘strategies’ are not defined contingently 
on states of the world that the parties are unable to write down in the contract or are even 
unable to foresee. These default rules are based on the satisfaction of a fuzzy membership 
condition of states with respect to the domain of abstract, general and universalizable ethical 
principles  that  are  ex  ante  known  (because  they  are a g r e e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t )  
(Sacconi, 2000; Zimmerman, 1991; Sacconi 2007b). Membership is always ex post verifiable 
through a shared understanding of the inherent vagueness of unforeseen contingencies with 
respect to the principle. Once these norms have been stated ex ante in terms of precautionary 
standards of behavior, it is possible to say how the firm is expected to behave in whatever 
unforeseen state that may put a general principle at risk, until contrary proof is given that the 
principle does not apply to the new situation. In other words, the firm types implementing or 
otherwise strategies of conformity to norms are described. Explicit norms then complete the 
description  of  the  game  form  by  substituting  default  rules  of  behavior  for  conditional 
strategies. What is involved here is not inductive learning about the probability of an already 
given set of possible but uncertain set of types, but the conception of the type set itself that 
contributes to an (approximate) description of what may occur in the future. Accordingly, the 

social  contract  role  is  constructive.  Through  the  agreed  statement  of  norms,  firms  and 
stakeholders construct an approximate model of the game that they will play in states of the 
world that they are ex ante unable to describe in every detail. 
Nevertheless, the cognitive (and constructive) function of norms takes us only half-way into 
our argument. A well-conceived game form makes it possible to define the players’ strategy 
combinations and equilibria wherein the firm may be described as acting in support of its 
reputation,  so  that  after  some  time  stakeholders  will  begin  to  trust  it.  Under  the  usual 
condition of the long-run player’s non-myopia, these equilibrium combinations include the 
firm’s continuing not to abuse and the stakeholders’ continuing to enter the relation with the 
firm. Nevertheless, in general, this will be just one of the many possible reputation equilibria 
of the game. Other equilibria will entail strategies of random compliance with the norm by the 
firm (a mixed repeated strategy) such that the stakeholder’s best response is to yield to the 
firm’s strategy (entering throughout all the game repetitions and enduring consequences from 
the firm’s partial abuse). Among these equilibria (see Figure 2, where the equilibrium set X of 
the repeated TG is depicted as the dashed area, and note in particular the equilibrium with 
average  discounted  payoffs  (0,  2.66)),  one  is  the  Stackelberg  equilibrium,  this  being  the 
equilibrium that the firm would select if it committed unilaterally to its preferred mixed type 
and induced stakeholders to play their best responses to such an irremovable commitment. 
(Note that in a non-cooperative repeated game such an irremovable commitment can only be 
‘simulated’ by the firm with the accumulation of a reputation of being such a type, so that 
stakeholders  play  their  best  responses  whereby  the  firm  must  respond  by  fulfilling  the 
commitment).  Under  such  an  equilibrium,  the  firm  must have been  able to accumulate a 
reputation for a mixed level of abuse which leaves stakeholders indifferent between entering 
or not entering – so that by entering a very large part of the potential surplus is appropriated 
by the mixed type firm.
There is no reason to assume that, because the Stackelberg equilibrium is one of the possible 
Nash equilibria, it must necessarily be the one selected. Yet there are also strong reasons to 
believe that in so far as no other element is introduced into the picture, player B will engage 
in maneuvers to develop a reputation that will allow him/her to select exactly this equilibrium, 
which  gives  him/her  the  highest  payoff  within  the  equilibrium  set.    To  sum  up,  when  a 
repeated  reputation  game  is  constructively  defined  in  terms  of  strategies  that  abide  or 
otherwise  with  the  ex  ante  agreed  CSR  norm,  the  game  will  have  too  many  equilibrium 
points, not just the ‘socially preferable’ equilibrium where the firm abstains from abusing 

       Fig. 2  Equilibrium set X of the repeated TG 

stakeholders  and  cooperates  with  them  at  any  stage. T h e n  t h e  t y p i c a l  g a m e  t h e o r e t i c a l  














Before going a step further, however, note that we have already obtained an important result – 
even if it is an admittedly partial one. It follows naturally from what has been said about the 
constructive role of explicitly agreed CSR social norms (and the related multiplicity problem) 
that effective self-regulation should not be confused with the standard economic view that if 
CSR is to emerge as an equilibrium behavior from endogenous incentives, its driving force 
must simply be ‘enlightened self-interest in the long run’. According to this view, a self-
interested entrepreneur who owns the firm, and cares only for his/her own self-interest in the 
long run (or, if s/he does not own the firm personally, cares for the self-interest of all the 
company  shareholders)  would  adopt  behavior  that  spontaneously  satisfies  the  company 
stakeholders’ interests with no need to single out a principle of fairness, either  to agree on 
any  social  contract  or  to  state  explicitly  any  charter  on  the  firm’s  fiduciary  duties  to 
stakeholders. Self-interest in the long run – or more concretely, maximizing total shareholder 
value in the long run - would naturally guarantee that the treatment of corporate stakeholders 
will fulfill their interests and claims, thus making any explicit statement of extended fiduciary 
duties superfluous. As a consequence, the only goal that should be specified as the proper 
constraint on managerial and entrepreneurial discretion in the management of the firm is the 
coherent pursuit of shareholder-value in the long run. The stakeholders’ legitimate  interests 
would be satisfied simply as a side-effect of this main goal, because they are related to it 

through a means-end relation. Hence whilst stakeholders are to be taken into account by the 
corporate strategy in the domain of means, only shareholders are recognized as sources for 
corporate ends
This view, of course, does not recognize any need for a norm that explicitly 
states a principle of fair balancing amongst stakeholders, even if it may be understood as not 
externally enforced but as self-imposed through self organization by those in an authority  
position in the firm.  
From  what  we  already  know,  however,  this  self-interest-in-the-long-run  view  is  clearly 
untenable.  First  of  all,  without  the  explicit  statement  of  a  CSR  norm  -  based  at  least 
hypothetically on agreement by the company stakeholders reached under ideal conditions of 
impartial bargaining - a long-run self-interested corporate strategy simulating the discharge of 
fiduciary duties owed to stakeholders may simply not exist (or be something that the firm 
cannot be aware of at all). This is implied by the case just discussed of unspecified game 
form. Under incompleteness of contracts, and without the protection of a constitution charter 
or a code of ethics stating general abstract principles and prophylactic rules of behavior about 
stakeholders’ fair treatment, no conditional commitment is defined with respect to unforeseen 
states of the world. Thus the firm cannot accumulate reputation due to its expected behavior 
in these states.    
Moreover, if such a behavior in the long run could be worked out as something of which the 
firm might be aware (and this will happen when a CSR norm is given), nevertheless other 
behaviors in the long run could also be worked out by the company, such that they provide 
very limited and minimal satisfaction of the stakeholders’ claims for fair treatment.  These 
further  behaviors  would  not  only  be  preferable  to  the  firm’s  owners;  they  would  also 
command  a  certain  acquiescence  by  the  stakeholders  –  which  could  be  made  indifferent 
between the prospects of giving in to these firm’s opportunistic strategies or refraining from 
entering any relationship with it.  We must conclude that the simple self-interest in the long-
run view, translated into shareholder value in the long-run doctrine, would imply a large 
amount  of  violation  of  stakeholders’  legitimate  claims  and  abuse  of  ownership-based 
authority. 
By contrast, the self-regulatory view defended here r e q u ire s th e e sta b lish me n t o f  e xp lic it 
norms arrived at by social dialogue and multi-stakeholder agreements, and taking the form of 
CSR governance codes or management standards voluntarily accepted by firms because they 
contain and specify the terms of the ideal and fair social contract between the firm and its 
stakeholders. They are explicitly formulated in language (written or oral) and their utterances 

state the extended fiduciary duties and obligations that the firm owes its stakeholders. At the 
same time they are voluntarily adhered to. And, as far as enforcement is concerned, they are 
not imposed by external legal sanctions but instead through endogenous social and economic 
sanctions  and  incentives.  In  this  sense  they  are  self-enforceable  explicit  norms  put  into 
practice essentially by means of endogenous economic and social forces such as reputation 
effects  and  conformity.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  such  a n o r m  w i l l  c o r r e s p o n d  t o  j u s t  o n e  
equilibrium among the many possible (see again fig. 2;  it is quite obvious that a norm of fair 
treatment  will  require  play  of  the  repeated  strategy  equilibrium  with  average  discounted 
payoffs (2, 2) ). Part II will show that the social contract on an explicitly expressed CSR 
standard and norm also performs a normative role by providing  an ex ante g uide for the 




1 At first glance, one might object to the idea that many stakeholders, in both the ‘strict’ and ‘broad’ senses, do 
not have relations with a firm such that they formally delegate authority to those who run it (for example, they do 
not vote).  The consequence is that the fiduciary duties as defined earlier do not apply to them. In the model of 
the social contract as a hypothetical explanation of the origin of the firm, however – see section 5.2 – all the 
stakeholders participate in the ‘firm’s second social contract’. The consequence is that their trust constitutes the 
authority of the firm’s owner and manager. This also explains how the latter’s authority may be accepted by 
these subjects. Moreover, the hypothetical social contract is typically used to explain how authority – that is, 
legitimate power – may come about at both the political and organizational levels; see, for example, Green 
(1990),  Raz  (1985)  and Watt  (1982).  For  a discussion  of  managerial  authority,  see  MacMahon  (1989)  and 
Sacconi (1991).  
However, consider debates on the business judgment  rule in relation to its consistency with  ‘team production 
theory’ as inherent in the American tradition of company law (Blair and Stout, 1999; Meese, 2002), but also see 
the recent UK company law reform – especially the introduction of the directors’ obligation to run the company 
“in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have regard”…. for the interest of stakeholders other than the 
“members” of the company (employees, customers, suppliers, communities and others), for the impact on the 
environment, and the company reputation conditioned by these relationships, which moreover states that when 
these further  purposes are  to be considered, beyond the interest of shareholders,  the meaning of  ‘promoting the  
success of the company in the interest of its members’ must be understood as if it included the pursuance of also 
these further purposes and interests. (The 2006 UK company law reform, Art. 172). Such an enlargement of the 
purposes that directors must pursue as the definition of the company success concept effectively opens the way 
to effective CSR self-regulation.  
Aoki  pays much attention to institutions of different level (‘generic, substantive and operational’)  and their 
mutual complementarities (Aoki 2007a, 2002). On the contrary,  my view of CSR as a corporate governance 

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institution emerging form the firm’s social contract is a ‘state of nature’ explanation such that other institutional 
levels do not significantly affect the interaction among stakeholders, and between the stakeholders and the firm 
(see  also  Sacconi  2000,  2006a,b,  2009).  Admittedly, t h e r e  a r e  b e n e f i t s  a n d  c o s t s  i n   b o t h  t h e  m o d e l l i n g 
strategies.  I maintain that there is an advantage in being able of considering what would happen in case the law 
in general made room for the firm’s social contract among all its concerned stakeholders seen as an endogenous 
institution  making  process, including both the ex ante settlement of a set of explicit norms and the solution of 
the ex post compliance and equilibrium selection problem. Nevertheless, in order to model the stakeholders’ 
social contract on the firm’s control and accountability structure as a governance institution, there is no need to 
consider it as a completely isolated object lost in a institutional vacuum. It is enough to  borrow the idea of 
“morally free zone” - as it was re-elaborated by Dunfee and Donaldson (1995) in quite a different way with 
respect to the original version given by David Gauthier (1986). ‘Small scale social contracts’ at industry, local or 
sectional levels are explicitly allowed by hyper-norms that are the object of the ‘general social contract’. The 
general  social  contract  leaves  intentionally  room  to  them  due  to  the  parties’  awareness  of  bounded  moral 
knowledge and rationality. However, by contrast also with Dunfee and Donaldson’s view, the small scale social 
contract of the firm is here explicitly modeled as the result of an ex ante bargaining between stakeholders under 
the  ‘veil  of  ignorance’  (see  also  part  II),  and  not j u s t  a s  a n  e x  p o s t  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n s t i t u t i o n .  W h e r e a s  the 
equilibrium condition was also true of  the local norms’ definition in Dunfee and Donaldson’s ISCT, seeing them 
as  ‘approved  social  convention’,  that  theory  was  unable  to  provide  a  proper  social  contract  model  for  the 
emergence  of  local  norms  –  i.e.  to  explain    them  in t e r m s  o f  a n  i m p a r t i a l  a g r e e m e n t  a m o n g  t h e  f i r m ’ s  
stakeholders on constitutional general principles and  preventives  rules  of  behavior.  This  is  provided  by the 
Rawlsian view of CSR.  
This is probably the opinion of Jensen when he says “Indeed, it is a basic principle of enlightened value 
maximization that we cannot maximize the long-term market value of an organization if we ignore or mistreat 
any important constituency. We cannot create value without good relations with customers, employees, financial 
backers, suppliers, regulators, and communities. But having said that, we can now use the value criterion for 
choosing among those competing interests. I say “competing” interests because no constituency can be given 
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